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Abstract
A botnet is a network of compromised machines (bots),
under the control of an attacker. Many of these machines
are infected without their owners’ knowledge, and botnets
are the driving force behind several misuses and criminal
activities on the Internet (for example spam emails). De-
pending on its topology, a botnet can have zero or more
command and control (C&C) servers, which are central-
ized machines controlled by the cybercriminal that issue
commands and receive reports back from the co-opted
bots.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of
the command and control infrastructure of one of the
world’s largest proprietary spamming botnets between
2007 and 2012: Cutwail/Pushdo. We identify the key
functionalities needed by a spamming botnet to operate
effectively. We then develop a number of attacks against
the command and control logic of Cutwail that target
those functionalities, and make the spamming operations
of the botnet less effective. This analysis was made possi-
ble by having access to the source code of the C&C soft-
ware, as well as setting up our own Cutwail C&C server,
and by implementing a clone of the Cutwail bot. With the
help of this tool, we were able to enumerate the number
of bots currently registered with the C&C server, imper-
sonate an existing bot to report false information to the
C&C server, and manipulate spamming statistics of an ar-
bitrary bot stored in the C&C database. Furthermore, we
were able to make the control server inaccessible by con-
ducting a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Our
results may be used by law enforcement and practitioners
to develop better techniques to mitigate and cripple other
botnets, since many of findings are generic and are due to
the workflow of C&C communication in general.
1 Introduction
Botnets, networks of compromised computers under the
control of the same cybercriminal, have been the tool
of choice of miscreants committing illicit actions on the
Internet for the last 10 years [10, 23, 29]. Security re-
searchers and law enforcement experts are constantly en-
gaged in an arms race with cybercriminals, finalized to
disrupt botnet operations [23, 32]. Unfortunately, this
arms race is difficult to win, because cybercriminals have
the advantage that they can react to the countermeasures
deployed by the security community and make their bot-
nets more resilient to takedowns [31]. Moreover, the fact
that botnet operations are distributed across the globe, and
that different critical parts of the malicious infrastructure
are typically located in different countries makes it partic-
ularly difficult for law enforcement to effectively coordi-
nate and take down such operations [22, 34].
Due to the complexity of the botnet phenomenon, a
wealth of research has been conducted on understanding
such cybercriminal operations. A category of work fo-
cuses on understanding the monetization of botnet opera-
tions [2, 16, 17, 20]. Botnets need to generate a profit for
their administrator (botmaster), and this usually happens
by renting them out to other cybercriminals or by using
them directly to perform illicit activities such as sending
email spam or stealing financial information from the vic-
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tim’s computer. Since the monetization part of these op-
erations often involves financial transactions with legiti-
mate institutions, researchers have identified the moneti-
zation of botnets as one of the weak links of cybercrim-
inal operations, and as a good point of intervention for
law enforcement [20]. A second line of research focused
on understanding the command and control infrastructure
used by botnets [6, 24, 31]. These systems typically aim
to reverse engineer the C&C protocol with the goal of
infiltrating the botnet and collecting important informa-
tion about the cybercriminal operation [16] or developing
systems to detect and block such communication in the
wild [13]. A third line of research focused on understand-
ing the modus operandi of cybercriminals using botnets,
and what makes their operations successful [14, 32]. The
focus of such research is to identify possible weak points
in the workflow followed by cybercriminals, and use such
weak points for botnet mitigation. As an example of such
research, Stringhini et al. [33] discovered that spammers
routinely clean up their email lists from non-existing ad-
dresses by having their bots report back the error codes
that they received while sending emails. As a possible
mitigation, they proposed that email servers send false
replies to detected bots, forcing the botmaster to remove
existing addresses from their email lists, and reducing the
amount of spam that such servers end up receiving.
In this paper, we bring the understanding that we as re-
searchers have of botnet operations even further. We ana-
lyze the source code of the command and control infras-
tructure of the Cutwail botnet [11, 32], which was one of
the world’s largest spamming botnets between 2007 and
2012. This source code was obtained as part of a take-
down operation that involved academics, Internet service
providers, and law enforcement in late 2010. Having ac-
cess to the source code of the C&C infrastructure provides
us with a complete view on the logic behind the com-
mand and control communication of a botnet, which so far
could have only been inferred by researchers from obser-
vation [6,24]. This allowed us to identify bottlenecks and
vulnerabilities in the workflow required for C&C commu-
nication, which could be used by researchers and practi-
tioners to cripple the effectiveness of the botnet.
For our experiments, we developed a stub bot imple-
mentation to connect to the C&C server, similar to what
done by researchers in the past [2, 30]. We then set up a
network of bots connecting to a C&C server under our
control, and performed a number of attacks ran by the
bots against their controller. We show that misbehav-
ing bots have the capability to enumerate the number of
bots currently registered with the C&C server, imperson-
ate an existing bot and reporting false information to the
C&C server, and make the control server inaccessible by
mounting a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
Interestingly, we show that 2,000 bots are enough to com-
pletely overwhelm the C&C channel and make the bot-
net non operational — such number is much smaller than
the number of bots that C&C servers can deal with in the
wild [14, 31, 32].
The insights presented in this paper can help re-
searchers and practitioners develop better techniques to
mitigate and cripple botnets. Although the analysis was
performed on a single botnet, many of our findings are
generic and are due to the workflow of command and con-
trol communication in general, rather than on implemen-
tation problems. The attacks that are demonstrated in this
paper could be used to solve the problem of reliably enu-
merating the size of botnets [28], deceiving botmasters by
making them believe that their bots are performing worse
than they are, or that they have been blacklisted, or help-
ing practitioners and law enforcement deploy fake bots
to dilute the communication capability of the botnet and
making it unusable for the cybercriminal.
In summary, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
1. We present an analysis of the command and control
infrastructure of Cutwail, a large spamming botnet.
As part of this analysis, we provide a detailed de-
scription of the workflow and the logic behind the
C&C communication of spamming botnets.
2. We develop a number of attacks against the com-
mand and control logic of Cutwail. We set up a
fake botnet in a restricted environment and demon-
strate the feasibility and effectiveness of our attacks
in gaining information about the botnet itself and
crippling its operations.
3. We discuss how our results generalize to other bot-
nets different from Cutwail, and how similar tech-
niques to the ones presented in this paper could be
used by law enforcement and practitioners to take
down botnets.
2 Background: the Cutwail botnet
In this section, we provide an overview of the key com-
ponents of the Cutwail botnet and its propagation mecha-
nism.
2.1 Generic C&C operations
To achieve its goals, a spamming botnet C&C needs to
perform three operations:
• Sending instructions to bots: the bots need to receive
instructions from the C&C server in order to deter-
mine which emails to send, and to whom.
• Communicating with bots in general: the C&C
server needs to manage its bots (e.g., keeping track
of active bots) by communicating with them period-
ically.
• Receiving reports from bots: the botmaster needs to
receive spamming statistics from the bots to measure
the performance of the botnet, and to tune the botnet
operation to make it more effective [14].
Regardless of the botnet’s implementation and topol-
ogy, the three operations described above are generic op-
erations of any spamming botnet. Intuitively, the botmas-
ter must be able to reach his bots to communicate and
send instructions, and receiving reports from the bots for
the outcome of their spamming operations is important to
measure the performance of the botnet, and to tune its op-
erations.
The factors that make spam campaigns successful pre-
sented by Iedemska et al. [14], state that experience is
what matters most for a spammer. Botmasters have
to housekeep their botnets well, and by manually tun-
ing botnet parameters, one can dramatically increase the
outcome of spamming campaigns. The attacks that we
present in this paper can be used to tamper with statistics
about the infected machines and overall spam operations
stored in the C&C database. Since botmasters rely on this
information to tune their botnets, these attacks can be used
to deceive the botmaster into reducing the effectiveness of
his own botnet by providing false information.
2.2 Cutwail botnet structure
Cutwail has a fairly simple structure consisting of three
different layers (as shown in Figure 1). Firstly, the bot-
master/spammer configures a spam campaign on the C&C
server. Then, the bots connect directly to the C&C server
and receive instructions about emails they should send.
After the co-opted bots have accomplished their task, they
report back spamming statistics (e.g., successful delivery,
blacklisted by domain, etc.) to the C&C server.
2.2.1 Encrypted communication protocol.
The original Cutwail botnet emerged in 2007, and has
evolved in sophistication using simple HTTP request to a
proprietary, encrypted protocol [32]. The encrypted pro-
tocol is implemented using a block cipher in electronic
codebook (ECB) mode. More details of the implementa-
tion of the protocol is available in [11].
2.2.2 Cutwail installation and infection process.
A typical Cutwail infection occurs when a compromised
machine executes a so-called ”loader” called Pushdo. Ex-
amples of infection vector include drive-by download, or
an attachment in a spam email. Pushdo behaves as an in-
stallation framework for downloading and executing var-
ious malware components including rootkits that hide the
presence of the malware in the infected machine, and the
Cutwail engine. After executing the Cutwail engine, the
Cutwail bot attempts to contact a command and control
server in order to receive serveral critical pieces of in-
formation to begin a spam campaign. Specifically, the
C&C server provides the bot with the actual spam content
through ”spam templates”. More details in the infection
process and the technical aspects of the operation of the
Pushdo loader are available in different studies [11, 32].
2.2.3 Spam contents.
The contents of the spam template include (i) a list of tar-
get email addresses (also known as bases) where a spam
will be delivered. (ii) a dictionary consisting of 71,377
entries for generating random sender/recipient names and
domains. (iii) a configuration file containing details that
control the spam engine’s behaviour (e.g., timing inter-
vals, error handling, etc.). The content of the email mes-
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the Cutwail botnet hierarchy.
sages sent by Cutwail included pornography, online phar-
macies, phishing, money mule recruitment and malware.
The malware (e.g., the Zeus banking Trojan) is typically
distributed by persuading a user to open an attachment
in the form of greeting card, resume, invitation, mail de-
livery failure, and a receipt of recent purchase. In addi-
tion, many of the emails contained links to malicious web-
sites that attempted to install malware on a victims system
through drive-by-download attacks.
2.2.4 Blacklisting.
One of the most important aspects of a spam campaign
is the ability to pass through both IP-based blacklists
and content-based filters. Bots that are not blacklisted
are the most valuable since they increase the chance of
successfully delivering spam. Each Cutwail bot period-
ically queries several blacklists (i.e., SORBS, SpamCop,
DNSBL), in order to determine its reputation (as shown in
Figure 1). This information is reported back to the C&C
server and recorded. The C&C server also queries the
blacklists periodically to determine the reputation of bots
currently registered in its database.
In order to evade detection by content-based filters, a
tool called macros can be used to instruct each bot to dy-
namically generate unique content for each email by mod-
ifying fields such as sender address, email subject line,
and body based on the spam template. Also, each Cutwail
C&C server runs a local instance of SpamAssassin, a free
open source email spam filter based on content-matching
rules. Once an email template has been generated, it is
passed through SpamAssassin and tweaked until it suc-
cessfully evades detection.
2.2.5 Infiltrating Cutwail.
Previous work on gaining insights into the operation of
botnets via infiltration (running clone bots, the so-called
”milkers” in controlled environments) is available from
[2, 7, 18, 19, 30]. Such work has primarily aimed at mon-
itoring the instructions issued to bots in order to investi-
gate how botmasters employ their botnets. In this paper,
we bring forward the idea of employing milkers as a tool
not only to monitor the Cutwail C&C operations, but also
to explore vulnerabilities in the C&C workflow and logic
to develop attacks against them.
3 Analysis of the Cutwail C&C soft-
ware
In this section, we present an analysis of the command and
control infrastructure of Cutwail. As part of this analysis,
we provide a detailed description of the workflow and the
logic behind the C&C communication. We obtained the
source code of the botnet by collaborating with Internet
Service Providers and law enforcement during a takedown
operation in 2010.
3.1 Installation process
The developer of Cutwail provides a shell script to as-
sist the installation of the Cutwail C&C software. The
software can be installed on a server running either Linux
or FreeBSD operating system.The installation script first
downloads libraries required to compile the program
code, initialises a MySQL database, and configures the
SpamAssassin service. Then, it configures the Makefile
that generates five binary executable files, which are in-
stalled under the /usr/local/psyche directory.
The database consists of 34 tables that stores informa-
tion about bots and information required to operate spam
campaigns. The bot table stores the bot identity number
(BID), IP address, timestamps (e.g., last seen, born date),
and spamming statistics for each registered bot. There
are 17 status codes for reporting the delivery result of a
spam email, including SENT (status code: 1), NO USER
(2), BLACKLISTED (5), NO MX (8), SMTP TIMEOUT
(11), and NO HOSTNAME (17). The botstatus table con-
tains general information about the botnet, e.g., the num-
ber of bots currently online. The base table has records
that reference files containing target emails addresses that
are used by bulk operations. The header, message, mail-
from, and macros tables contain information used to gen-
erate a spam template, which is sent to the bots, and in-
structions for dynamically generating a unique spam con-
tent based on the template.
3.2 Command and control program
The main executable file responsible for running the spam
operation is called spcntrl (spam control). Also an exe-
cutable called spsupport is run to support the spam oper-
ation by, for example, querying the IP-based blacklists in
order to determine the reputation of bots registered in the
database. Every time the spcntrl program is executed, it
immediately computes and compares the hash code of the
host’s network interface configuration to the one gener-
ated during the installation process, and terminates if they
do not match. This is a mechanism for preventing secu-
rity analysts from debugging the program that has been
moved onto a different environment.
After the program has successfully started, it loads
what are called common configurations from the database.
These are general configurations that control the spam en-
gine’s behaviour, which are independent from the config-
uration of each bulk operation. Common configurations
define constants such as the IP address of the C&C server,
the current version of the C&C software, timing intervals,
and the maximum number of bots the server can control.
After loading these configurations, the control program
creates three threads for managing bots, bulk operations,
and TCP connections from port number 43,242.
Figure 2 shows a flowchart of the operation of the bot
management thread. Firstly, the C&C server waits for a
bot to establish a TCP connection and sends a valid re-
quest to the server. After receiving the request, the server
processes the header field, which contains the bot identi-
fier number (BID) of the bot. If the BID is zero, the bot is
identified as ”new” and the server will assign a new BID
to the bot and also record its information (e.g., BID, IP
address, and timestamps) in the database. Otherwise, the
server will expect an encrypted spamming report from the
bot, which is decrypted and recorded in the database.
The C&C server runs an Apache web server that hosts
a web interface, which allows the botmaster/spammer to
configure and manage bulk operations (or spamming op-
erations) from a browser. If there are any bulk operations
currently in the ”working” state, the server will send the
corresponding spam template to the bot (if it has not been
sent before). Also it will distribute a portion of the email
database list if it is not empty, and the target email ad-
dresses (also known as bases) that are distributed to the
bots are removed from the list. If the bot is identified as
blacklisted, the server will not send any spam templates
or bases to that bot.
The bot management thread has no mechanism for ver-
ifying the integrity of the BID field in the server request
header other than using it to determine if a bot with that
BID is currently registered in the database. This makes
the command and control logic vulnerable to various ex-
ploits that are described later in this paper.
3.3 Encrypted communication protocol
As previously described, Cutwail encrypts its communi-
cation using a block cipher in ECB mode with an encryp-
tion key 29 characters long: ”Poshel-ka ti na hui drug
Figure 2: Operation of the bot management thread.
aver” [11]. After conducting a white box analysis by
studying 13,904 lines of uncommented C source code and
debugging the command and control program, we have
gained an understanding in what each field in the server
request mean, how they are processed, and how the server
response is generated.
Figure 3 shows the dissection of the 2-field type mes-
sages sent and received from the server. The server re-
quest consists of an unencrypted request header, followed
by an encrypted data package consisting of zero to one
bot bulk info structure, followed by zero or more bulk
info structures. The ”size” field in the request header de-
fines the size of the encrypted data package that follow (in
bytes), which is used by the decryption function. Also,
the header contains fields such as the BID, local IP ad-
dress, Windows version, common configuration version,
and the version of the bot (or the Pushdo loader). The bot
bulk info structure contains general information about the
bulk operation that is assigned to the bot (e.g., the bulk ID,
and the spam template version number), and its ”logsize”
field defines the number of bulk info structures, i.e., the
number of spam email reports that follow (default max-
imum of 1500). The email ID number and the delivery
status code (previously described, e.g., SENT, BLACK-
LISTED, NO HOSTNAME, etc.) of each spam email is
stored individually in each of the bulk info structures.
The server response simply consists of an unen-
crypted response header, which contains the com-
mand type and the size of the encrypted data pack-
age that follow. There are nine command types in-
cluding RC SLEEP, RC GETWORK, RC RESTART,
RC UPDATE, RC BID, and RC TEMPLATE (RC stands
for Response Command), which determine the content of
the data package, e.g., a new BID of the bot, bases, or the
spam template.
4 Cutwail clone implementation
The Cutwail clone implements the encryption/decryption
algorithm described in [11], and the protocol operation
that is used to communicate with the C&C server is de-
scribed below.
1. Establish a TCP connection with the C&C server on
port 43,242.
Figure 3: 2-field type messages of server request and response.
2. Send a server request with the structure described in
section 3.3 (with the BID initially set to zero), and
wait for the server response.
3. Upon receiving a response, extract the first four bytes
of the (unencrypted) header, which correspond to the
command type, and the remaining four bytes in the
header to see the size of the encrypted data pack-
age. Decrypt the encrypted data package if its size is
greater than zero.
4. If the command type is:
RC BID. Extract the BID value from the decrypted
data and change the BID of the clone bot accord-
ingly.
Otherwise. Record the command type and the de-
crypted data (e.g., RC TEMPLATE and the spam
template data), and continue.
5. Return to step 2.
The clone bot only implements the communication fea-
ture of the botnet and does not cause any harm by sending
spam emails, etc. The only difference between a real bot
and the clone is the interpretation of the command type in
step 4.
4.1 SSH botnet
We have set up a SSH botnet, which in our experiment
consists of 19 virtual machines each capable of running
up to 1024 instances of the Cutwail clone. This gives us
the capability of controlling up to 19,456 Cutwail clones,
which can be used mount a distributed denial of service
attack against the Cutwail command and control server
by just instructing each clone to speak the communica-
tion protocol described above. We are by no means lim-
ited to using more virtual machines for the SSH botnet,
and if necessary, the number of virtual machines can be
increased to raise the total population of the clone bots.
5 Attacks against the Cutwail bot-
net
In the following section, we describe four attacks against
the command and control logic of Cutwail that can be
used to gain information about the botnet itself and crip-
ple its operations. Specifically, we aim to exploit vulnera-
bilities in the three generic C&C operations of spamming
botnets (described in section 2.1) that we can discover to
disrupt the operation of Cutwail. By doing this, we aim to
showcase attacks that can be used for mitigation and take-
down purposes against any spamming botnet, regardless
of its specific implementation.
Firstly, the C&C operation of sending instructions to
bots is exploited by using the clone bots to continuously
request the C&C server for bases, thereby preventing
those bases to be received by real bots, and eventually,
exhausting the base list maintained by the control server.
Secondly, the C&C operation of communicating with bots
in general is exploited by mounting a distributed denial of
service attack to saturate the server with external com-
munication requests and make it respond so slowly as to
be rendered non operational. We show that it is possible
to completely disrupt the Cutwail C&C operation by us-
ing 2000 bots, which is a much smaller number than the
number of bots typically controlled by C&C servers in the
wild. Finally, the C&C operation of receiving spamming
reports from bots is exploited by using the clone bot to re-
port false spamming reports on behalf of an arbitrary bot
currently registered by the C&C server. We also describe
an attack to enumerate the number of bots currently reg-
istered in the server database. Although this attack does
not exploit any of the three generic C&C operations, it is
used as an auxiliary attack for reporting fake spamming
reports.
5.1 Exhausting the base list
This attack exploits the generic C&C operation of sending
instructions to bots. Each bulk operation must reference
a file containing a finite list of bases (i.e., target email ad-
dresses) that are loaded during the start up of the spcntrl
program. These bases are distributed to bots upon request,
and bases that have been distributed are removed from the
list. When the base list becomes empty, the bulk opera-
tion simply stops distributing spam templates and bases
to bots, and waits for spamming statistics to be reported.
Therefore, it is possible to constantly request the C&C
server from the clone bot to receive bases until the list
of bases become exhausted/empty. This will prevent real
Cutwail bots from receiving spam templates and bases,
which are required to perform their spamming operations.
5.2 Distributed denial of service attack
This attack exploits the generic C&C operation of manag-
ing bots by communicating with them in general. We use
the SSH botnet described in section 4.1, to mount a dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against the botnet
control server. The C&C server has a limited bandwidth
and is limited to the number of concurrent connections it
can manage from bots. Like other DDoS attacks, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish legitimate traffic from real bots and
those generated by bots under our control. This makes
this attack difficult to defend against, and it will overload
the server by saturating it with external communication
requests and/or making it respond so slowly as to be ren-
dered non operational.
5.3 Enumerating the number of bots regis-
tered
This attack is used as an auxiliary task, and ise needed
to report fake spamming reports. In addition, this attack
could be used to solve the problem of reliably enumerat-
ing the size of botnets. Previous research [7,30,32] under-
lined the difficulty of estimating the size of botnets, which
makes this attack particularly useful.
The BID column in the bot table in the C&C database
is an auto-incremented primary key. When a new bot con-
tacts the control server, it is given the largest BID in the
current table incremented by one. As previously men-
tioned in our analysis, the control server has no mech-
anism for verifying the integrity of the BID field in
the server request header except for checking whether a
record exists for that identifier in the table. Therefore, it
is possible to impersonate an existing Cutwail bot by just
spoofing the BID field in the request header. An interest-
ing behaviour is observed when doing this. If a record
for the spoofed BID already exists in the table, the server
replies with the RC BID command, followed by a data
package containing the same BID in the request. On the
other hand, if the record does not exist in the table or the
BID is equal to zero, the server identifies the bot as ”new”
and replies with a new BID.
Based on these observations, it is possible to enumerate
the number of bots registered in the database by going
through the following steps:
1. Firstly, send a request to the server with the BID field
set to zero in the header.
2. The server will reply with the largest BID value in
the table, incremented by one. This value is used
as the upper bound to the number of bots currently
registered in the database.
3. Send a server request with a spoofed BID field for
each BID between one and the upper bound (ob-
tained in step 2) decremented by one.
4. For each server response, compare the BID con-
tained in the response header to the one in the request
header. If they are equal, increment the bot count by
one; otherwise, the BID does not exist in the table.
The value obtained in step 2 is used as the upper bound,
since some BID records less than that value is not guaran-
teed to exist because an experienced botmaster will re-
move records of bots that are performing badly to in-
crease the effectiveness of his spam campaign. This is
why steps 3 and 4 are executed to account for the missing
BID records.
5.4 Reporting fake spamming reports
This attack exploits the generic C&C operation of receiv-
ing spamming reports from bots. After identifying the bot
records that exist in the database (from the auxiliary enu-
meration attack), we can manipulate the spamming statis-
tics of an arbitrary bot that is currently registered in the
database by spoofing its BID and sending bot bulk info
and bulk info data containing false spamming reports. As
explained in section 3.3, the bulk info structure has a sta-
tus field, which can be set to any email delivery status,
e.g., BLACKLISTED (status code: 5), which will cause
the bot appear to be blacklisted by the domain of the tar-
get email address, for example, gmail.com. By making
the bots appear to be performing worse than they are, bot-
masters may be deceived into abandoning those bots in
attempt to increase the effectiveness of the botnet.
Also, we have observed that whenever a Cutwail bot
establishes a TCP connection with the control server, the
IP address, and the ”last seen” field in the bot database is
updated for the specified BID record. This means that by
impersonating a currently registered bot, we can overwrite
its IP address with the IP address of the clone, and the
”last seen” field with the current time. Assuming that the
real bot is not going to connect back anytime soon, we can
deceive the botmaster by making old or inactive bots ap-
pear to be active. Additionally, the IP address of the clone
can be spoofed to the one that is known to be in the black-
list (e.g., DNSBL), thus it is possible to blacklist all the
bots that are currently registered in the database by over-
writing their IP addresses. This could cripple the spam-
ming operation of the botnet as the C&C server avoids
distributing work to blacklisted bots.
6 Evaluation
This section presents the feasibility and effectiveness of
each of the attacks described in the previous section.
6.1 Experimental setup
We have been careful to design experiments that we be-
lieve are ethical. The attacks were tested in a controlled
environment with our Cutwail C&C server and clone bots
running on VMware virtual machines with the host-only
network configuration. However, by simulating the com-
munication between the control server and bots over a vir-
tual network adapter, we may have simulated the commu-
nication channel with a higher bandwidth compared with
that of the Internet.
6.2 Exhausing the base list
During the attack, a clone bot queried the C&C server
for some bases used for the bulk operation. As previ-
ously explained, the bases that are distributed to the bots
are removed from the base list containing a finite num-
ber of bases. As a result, the base list maintained by
the C&C server quickly became empty, and the server
stopped sending spam templates and bases to all the bots
in the botnet thereafter. By exhausting the base list, the at-
tack will essentially prevent real Cutwail bots from receiv-
ing information required to perform their spamming op-
eration. By default, Cutwail distributes 1000 target email
addresses to each bot, which means that 1000 clone bots
would deplete a list of 1 million email addresses. The at-
tack will therefore, reduce the number of spam emails that
are sent to the bases distributed to the clone bots, and thus,
reducing the effectiveness of the spam campaign. This at-
tack can also be conducted in conjunction with the DDoS
attack to use multiple clones to speed up the process of
exhausting the list of bases.
6.3 Distributed denial of service attack
To test the effect of the DDoS attack, the C&C server is
initialised with a bulk operation with a base list containing
2048 entries. The rate at which bots are registered (shown
in Figure 4) and the server response time against the num-
ber of online bots (shown in Figure 5) are measured while
the server is attacked by 1000 bots or 19,456 bots con-
trolled by the SSH botnet. During the course of the attack,
each clone bot is instructed to overload the C&C server by
continually sending server requests.
In Figure 4a, we can see that the C&C server manages
to register all 1000 clone bots in 40 seconds. In Figure 4b,
since 19,456 Cutwail clones are running, the C&C server
is expected to register around 19,456 bots. However, the
number of bots that get successfully registered decreases
dramatically once the server has registered above 2000
bots. The C&C server at this point is overloaded with
communication from the clone bots that are already regis-
tered, such that it cannot process requests from new bots.
Therefore, the DDoS attack essentially prevents any new
real Cutwail bots from even registering with the C&C
server. It is interesting that only 2000 bots are enough
to completely overwhelm the C&C channel and make the
botnet non operational - such a number is much smaller
than the number of bots that C&C servers can deal with
in the wild. The only difference is that the clone bots are
instructed to flood the server with requests whereas real
bots would only contact the server once they have accom-
plished their tasks.
Notice that the y-axis in Figure 5 is using a logarith-
mic scale. During the DDoS attack, as we increased the
number of online (clone) bots, the server response time
increased exponentially. The maximum number of bots
used to record the response time was around 2000 due to
the server overload. This result shows that not only the
DDoS attack prevents new bots from registering, but it
also slows down the server response time exponentially
to existing bots. Furthermore, the botnet is expected to
perform worse than the results presented, since the com-
munication channel on the Internet would have a narrower
network bandwidth compared to that of the virtual net-
work adapter used in the experiment.
6.4 Enumerating the number of bots
To simulate the situation where the Cutwail server has
registered some bots and is waiting for their response, the
bot table in the database is initialised with dummy records
with 100 as the largest BID. The records for BIDs, 20 to
29 and 50 to 59, are removed from the table to simulate
poor performing bots deleted by the the botmaster.
Figure 5: Server response time against number of online
bots.
The result of the attack for the experimental setup de-
scribed above is shown in Figure 6. The attack success-
fully enumerated the number of bots currently registered
in the database. However, previous research of Cutwail by
Stone-Gross et al. [32] state that while these BID values
are unique, they do not appear to be an accurate indica-
tor of the total number of bots managed amongst different
Cutwail C&C servers. First, a Cutwail bot may connect
to multiple C&C servers over its lifetime, and thus, sev-
eral C&Cs may have their own identifier for a single bot
possibly due to a bug in the malware.
Although we have devised a method for accurately
counting the number of bots registered in a single C&C
server, it is not feasible to just add the results obtained
from different servers to estimate the total population of
bots managed amongst multiple servers. There are other
methods for estimating the total population of bots, for
example, by counting unique IP addresses of bots that
connect to the C&C server, but this will require eaves-
dropping the communication channel to the control server
rather than attacking the server itself.
6.5 Reporting fake spamming reports
The BIDs that exist in the database can be identified by
running the enumeration attack. In this experiment, the
clone impersonates a ”real” bot by spoofing its BID in
the server request header. The clone is instructed to send
a false spamming report (BLACKLISTED) on behalf of
the real bot. However, we also test the situation where
(a) 1000 clone bots (b) 19456 clone bots
Figure 4: Number of bot registered against time during DDoS attack.
Figure 6: Result for enumerating number of bots currently
registered.
the real bot is currently connected with the C&C server in
order to see how the C&C server responds to connections
from duplicate BIDs.
The result of reporting fake spamming reports is shown
in Figure 7. The real bot first reports the SENT status for
two of the spam emails assigned. Then the clone bot re-
ports the BLACKLISTED status, which is stored in the
same BID record. By debugging the command and con-
trol program, we have found that although the real bot
and the clone bot share the same BID, they are internally
treated as different bots by the control server and the BID
value is only used to reference a row in the database to
store the spamming statistics. This logic could be ex-
ploited to manipulate the spamming statistics of an arbi-
trary bot currently registered in the database regardless of
whether it is currently connected to the control server.
Figure 7: Result for reporting false spam delivery status.
This attack could be used to deceive botmasters by
making them believe that their bots are performing poorly.
Previous research showed that successful spammers take
this feedback into account, and stop using bots that are
blacklisted or email addresses that are non existent [14,
33]. This is an effective strategy for mitigating spamming
operations of botnets since it leads to a double bind for the
botmaster/spammer: on one hand if the botmaster consid-
ers the feedback, he will remove a valid bot from his bot-
net. Effectively, this will reduce the size of the spamming
botnet. On the other hand, if the botmaster does not con-
sider the feedback, this reduces the effectiveness of his
spam campaigns since the C&C server will continue to
use bots that are actually performing badly.
7 Discussion
The attacks presented in this paper may not be specific
to the Cutwail botnet since they exploit the generic C&C
operations of spamming botnets. The base list exhaustion
attack, DDoS attack, and reporting fake spamming reports
all exploit the generic operations of sending instructions
to bots, communicating with bots in general, and receiv-
ing reports from bots respectively. Our findings have a
number of implications as follows.
7.0.1 Deceiving the botmaster.
We have shown that it is possible to enumerate the number
of bots currently registered with the Cutwail C&C server.
Also by spoofing their BIDs, it is possible to impersonate
an arbitrary bot to report false information to the C&C.
These attacks exploit the the generic operation of bots re-
porting back the outcomes of their operations to the C&C
server. This gives us the capability of manipulating in-
formation that botmasters use to tune their botnets, and
they may be deceived into abandoning bots that appear
to be performing worse that they are or that they have
been blacklisted, therefore reducing the size of the botnet.
Additionally, this will have an economic impact on the
botmaster as he will need to replenish his supply of bots,
thinking that they are not suitable to the task anymore.
This could lead him to buy new bots from the underground
market or by using pay-per-install (PPI) services.
So far we have described the enumeration of the num-
ber of bots as an auxiliary attack for impersonating an ar-
bitrary bot in the botnet, however it can also be used to
identify larger botnets in order to prioritize takedowns.
Although the implementation of the enumeration attack
described in section 5.3 is quite specific to the Cutwail
botnet, similar techniques may be devised for other bot-
nets by reverse engineering their command and control
infrastructure.
7.0.2 Crippling the effectiveness of the botnet.
As we saw, we can exploit the generic operation of the
C&C server communicating with its bots in general by
conducting a DDoS attack. We have shown that it is pos-
sible to saturate the server with external communication
requests as to prevent real Cutwail bots from registering
with the server. Also, we have observed that the attack
will increase the response time of the server exponentially
as we artificially increase the number of online (clone)
bots. The most interesting result is that only 2000 clones
were sufficient to overload the server, which is much
smaller than the number of bots the C&C server can man-
age in the wild (typically around 10,000 bots [14]). Ad-
ditionally, the generic operation of the C&C server send-
ing instructions to its bots can be exploited by exhausting
the base list maintained by each bulk operation run by the
C&C server. A consequence of this is that the C&C server
distributes most of the bases to the clone bots instead of
the the real bots, hence the number of spam emails that
will be sent to those email address can be reduced.
Since all of the attacks are implemented by just in-
structing the clone bot to speak the communication pro-
tocol of the botnet, in order to defend against the attack
the botmaster has to first solve the problem of distinguish-
ing legitimate server requests with those generated by the
clones.
Although the analysis was performed on a single bot-
net (i.e., Cutwail), the insights presented in this paper can
help law enforcements and practitioners develop better
techniques to mitigate and cripple other spamming bot-
nets since many of our finding are generic and are due
to the workflow of command and control communication
in general (e.g., distributing bases, communicating with
bots, and reporting spamming statistics), rather than on
implementation problems.
8 Related Work
Computer security researchers have paid a considerable
amount of attention to the threats posed by botnets and
their operations [10]. Existing research in the field of bot-
nets mostly falls in two categories: botnet analysis and
botnet mitigation.
Botnet Analysis. At their beginning, botnets mostly
used Internet Relay Chat (IRC) as their C&C channel.
In 2006, Abu Rajab et al. tracked 192 unique IRC
botnets and gained precious insights on how these net-
works operated [1]. Once botnets moved away from IRC
and started using proprietary C&C protocols, researchers
started writing their own bots speaking such protocols and
infiltrated multiple botnets [2, 7, 18, 19, 30]. Their analy-
sis and results provided valuable information on how bot-
nets are operated. In this project, we implemented our
own stub bot to speak Cutwail’s C&C protocol. Unlike
previous work, who had to reverse engineer the protocol
from observations or binary analysis, we were fortunate
enough to have access to the server-side code. Chiang et
al. studied the Rustock spambot and provided an analy-
sis of this spamming botnet, which was the most active
between 2010 and 2011 [5]. Decker et al. performed a
similar analysis based on the Pushdo trojan [11]. Rossow
et al. presented a taxonomy of peer-to-peer botnets [29].
Recently. Nadji et al. discussed how to perform effec-
tive botnet takedowns [23]. The issue of botnet takedowns
is very complex, and this paper could help practitioners
and law enforcement in devising possible techniques to
perform effective ones.
Previous analysis of the Cutwail botnet was presented
by Stone Gross et al. [32], and it was based on the data
collected from multiple C&C servers as a result of an
attempted takedown. Our work integrates the one con-
ducted previously, offering a detailed view of the C&C
protocol used by Cutwail as well as presenting some weak
points in the control workflow of the botnet, which could
be used to cripple it and make it less efficient. In addition,
we show how our observations could be applied to dif-
ferent botnets than Cutwail, because many of them tackle
weaknesses in the workflow of a botnet, rather than in its
specific implementation.
Botnet mitigation. A number of projects dealt with auto-
matically reverse engineering the C&C protocol used by
botnets, by performing dynamic analysis on the bot bina-
ries. Such systems allowed researchers to gain a better
understanding of the C&C protocols, and use that knowl-
edge to infiltrate multiple botnets [3, 4, 8, 9, 21, 35]. In
this project, we analyzed the server-side code of the C&C
communication of a large botnet. This allowed us to get a
better understanding of the workflow followed by botmas-
ters in managing their bots, and identifying weak points in
such workflow.
Other work focused on identifying C&C traffic in net-
work data, and use this for detection [12,13,25,36,38]. A
problem that this type of projects faces is the increasing
use of cryptography by botmasters, which makes the cre-
ation of signatures difficult. In this project, having access
to the source code of the C&C server allowed us to get
a deep knowledge of the cryptographic protocol used by
Cutwail, without need to reverse engineer it.
Other work looked at the activity performed by bots
and used that for detection. PRominent examples used
the email spam activity of bots to this purpose [15,26,27,
37, 39]. The observations in this paper are more general,
and could generalize to botnets that are used for other pur-
poses, such as performing DoS attacks.
Stringhini et al. [33] proposed a system to provide false
information to botmasters and makes their operations less
effective. Their system works by having a mailserver send
false information to a known bot (for example a black-
listed one). In this paper, we bring forward this idea, and
show the feasibility of creating fake bots that impersonate
existing ones, and provide the botmaster with false infor-
mation about them, forcing him to dropping such bots and
purchasing new ones. We believe that this type of strategy
could help greatly in the task of botnet mitigation.
9 Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of the command and con-
trol infrastructure of Cutwail, one of the world’s largest
spamming botnet between 2007 and 2012. Also we have
developed a number of attacks against the command and
control logic of the server, which were made possible
by setting up a network of clone Cutwail bots in a con-
trolled environment. Our experiments show that misbe-
having bots have the capability of not only being able to
extract information about spamming campaigns operated
by the botnet, but also to manipulate critical information
stored in the server database to deceive the botmaster, and
to cripple the effectiveness of the botnet by overloading
the control server. Our inside view of the command and
control infrastructure of Cutwail and the infiltration strate-
gies developed offer new insights to law enforcement and
practitioners to devise similar techniques to take down
other botnets.
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